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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to accomplish four goals. First, to establish the extent to which a
gender wage gap exists in the American workforce and why it matters. Second, it seeks
to explore the various factors that scholars have advanced as potential explanations for
this gap with the aim of identifying a more concrete and all-encompassing root cause of
the gender wage gap as it exists today. Third, this thesis will individually evaluate a
succession of equal pay legislation which has been enacted to date in order to discern the
effectiveness of previous attempts to address this root cause, as well as the gender wage
gap as a whole, through legislative intervention. Finally, to offer prescriptions based on
scholarly evidence of how this issue could be better addressed whether by strengthening
past legislation or through the enactment of future equal pay legislation.

Keywords: Gender Wage Gap, Occupational Segregation, Equal Pay Act of 1963, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent research finds that women in the American workforce earn 77 cents for
every dollar a man earns (Ford 2006). The existence of this “gender wage gap” has been
a policy issue since women entered the workforce. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness
of legislative attempts to address this problem. Starting with the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA), this paper explores how this legislation and subsequent legislation impact this
problem. The goal of this analysis is to make informed predictions about future trends in
wage disparities between men and women and to offer recommendations for how this gap
could be better addressed through legislative intervention.
The first chapter of this thesis seeks to identify the many explanations for the
gender wage gap which have been offered by scholars, examining their relative strengths
and weaknesses with the aim of identifying a concrete explanation for the gender wage
gap. Identifying the cause of this phenomenon will have important policy implications.
Indeed, the cause of this problem should, in large measure, shape the solution which is
chosen to address it. In subsequent chapters, this explanation will be held up to the many
legislative initiatives from the EPA, to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the

1

Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the recent Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 which have
been aimed at addressing the gender wage gap, in order to identify the relative merits and
shortcomings of each initiative in achieving its stated goals. Each of these legislative
initiatives will be examined in turn, with special attention being directed at assessing how
well each addressed the root cause of the gender wage gap. Ultimately, the final chapter
will seek to offer prescriptions for how the wage gap, as it exists today, could be
narrowed through legislative intervention based on scholarly evidence. Overall, this
analysis should not only provide valuable insight into the causes of wage inequality
between the sexes, but draw important conclusions about the role of legislative
intervention in addressing this gap. Wage inequality between the sexes has been an
enduring issue in the American workforce and will continue to pervade our society if
unchecked.
EXTENT OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP
According to U.S. Bureau of the Census data in 2003, women’s median earnings
were $30,599 while men’s median earnings were considerably higher at $40,556 (U.S.
Census Bureau Data 2003). According to a recent Congressional Research Service
(CRS) Report concerning pay equity legislation in the 109th Congress, such wage
disparities among the sexes may even be noted within similar groups in the workforce.
For instance, in 2003 women with a bachelor’s degree employed year-round full-time
earned $47,910, while men with similar levels of education earned $69,913 (Dale and
Levine 2005). Male and female high school graduates demonstrated similar wage
disparities with men earning $38,331 on average, considerably more than their female
2

counterparts who earned $27,956 on average (Dale and Levine 2005). Moreover, there is
evidence to suggest that the wage gap is narrowest among the youngest members of the
workforce and typically widens in relation to age increase (Dale and Levine 2005).
In general, the wage gap has narrowed at a slow, and often uneven, pace over
time. The most notable period of increased pay equity to date occurred during the 1980s
during which women’s wages steadily climbed to reach nearly 70 cents for every dollar a
man earned (Dale and Levine 2005). Data from both the Bureau of the Census as well as
the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that this steady upward climb of women’s wages
was not sustained during the 1990s (Dale and Levine 2005). Despite the ongoing
struggle to achieve parity in wages between the sexes through various legislative
initiatives as well as the ever increasing involvement of women in the American
workforce, the wage gap has only narrowed by a mere 15 percent over the last 40 plus
years (Dale and Levine 2005).
WHY THE WAGE GAP MATTERS
The consequences of the wage gap are both widespread and numerous.
According to a 2007 publication by the American Association of University Women
(AAUW),
In part, pay equity is simply a matter of fairness…the larger issue at stake in pay
equity, however, revolves around family values (Goldberg-Dey and Hill 2007).
In regards to fairness, when women are paid less than men the means by which they are
able to support themselves, as well as their families, are compromised. In this sense, the
3

gender wage gap can have negative consequences not only for women in the American
workforce, but also for their children. This is particularly true in the case of single
mothers, an ever growing demographic in the U.S. workforce. More broadly, the gender
wage gap “impedes women’s ability to negotiate in the workplace, at home, and in the
political arena” (Goldberg-Dey and Hill 2007). By earning less, women will
automatically experience the disadvantage of a more precarious economic status.
Moreover, due to their inferior earning potential, women may feel reluctant to question
even the most blatantly discriminatory wages for fear of poverty.
Indeed, the feminization of poverty is quite staggering when approached from a
quantitative perspective. According to a recent report released by the U.S. Census
Bureau, in 2009 single-parent homes headed by women constituted nearly 83% of all
single-parent homes U.S (U.S. Census Bureau). Moreover, single-parent homes headed
by women were nearly twice as likely as single-parent homes headed by men to be below
poverty level. Perhaps most striking, in 2009 29.9 percent of single-parent homes headed
by women lived in poverty while only 5.8 percent of dual-parent families lived in
poverty. Thus, single-parent homes headed by women were nearly five times as likely to
be below poverty level as dual-parent homes. Such statistics only serve to further
emphasize the importance of the gender wage gap by highlighting its impact not only on
women, but also on their families.
In regards to family values, many critics of the gender wage gap have argued that
the American workforce can be very unforgiving toward those women who choose to
pursue motherhood alongside their career (Goldberg-Dey and Hill 2007). As the
4

traditional caregivers in our society, women face the challenge of balancing the
responsibilities of home and career in an ever more competitive job market which
rewards long hours while often offering maternity leave provisions that are limited at
best. Not to mention the struggle that mothers face as they attempt to reenter the
workforce after their absence, many find themselves out of step or obsolete in an ever
changing market.
Wage inequality affects all women, single or married, old or young, college
educated or high school graduate, mothers, daughters and everywhere in between. Yet
there is still considerable debate concerning the cause of this phenomenon as well as what
should be done to address it. After nearly 50 years and several legislative initiatives the
gap still endures, this is precisely the curiosity on which this thesis aims to shed some
light.

5

CHAPTER 2

LIT REVIEW

A number of scholars have realized the importance of seeking to identify a
concrete explanation for the gender wage gap. Indeed, the cause of this phenomenon has
important policy implications for addressing these wage disparities. Among the many
explanations for the wage gap that scholars have offered are the disparity in levels of
human capital between the sexes, compensating wage differentials, statistical
discrimination, and occupational segregation. Ultimately, the gender wage gap may be
attributable to one or many of these factors. However, this chapter seeks to examine the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the many explanations for the gender wage gap
which have been offered by scholars with the aim of identifying a more concrete and allencompassing explanation for the gender wage gap.
HUMAN CAPITAL
Many researchers have suggested that differences in levels of human capital
between men and women are at least partially to blame for the gender wage gap. Human
capital may be defined as the “productive capacities of human beings as income
producing agents in the economy” (Rosen 2008). These productive capacities may be
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manifested in a number of forms including, but not limited to, work-related skills, years
of work experience, and amount of schooling. According to Paula England, “amount of
schooling…explains virtually none of the sex gap in pay, since men and women in the
labor force have virtually the same median years of formal education” (England 1992 ).
However, England does suggest that amount of job experience has some bearing on the
gender wage gap suggesting that, on average, women have fewer years of job experience
than men. In fact, a number of studies have suggested that this factor explains between
one quarter and one half of the gender wage gap (England 1992). Researchers have
attributed these disparities in work experience to the fact that women, since they are
responsible for the majority of child rearing in our society, are less likely than men to
gain work experience and skills, or human capital, and are therefore less likely to qualify
for higher paying jobs.
The effect of motherhood on the accumulation of human capital in the form of job
experience and subsequent earnings by women in the American workforce is wellillustrated by Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) and Noonan, Corcoran, and Courant
(2005). In a cross-sectional examination of graduates from the University of Michigan
Law School, Wood et al. concluded that parenting responsibilities accounted for over
40% of the perceived wage gap in their 1979 and 1985 cohorts. In fact, a later study
conducted by Noonan et al. using 1987 and 1993 cohorts from the University of
Michigan Law School illustrated a strikingly similar relationship with parenting
responsibilities accounting for 55 to 60% of wage differences (Noonan, Corcoran, and
Courant 2005).
7

However, when controlling for sex-based differences in work-hours, work
interruptions, and part-time work, both cohorts in the later studies demonstrated that
childless women earn no more than mothers, and single women earn no more than
married women (Noonan, Corcoran, and Courant 2005). Thus, the wage disparities in
these cohorts were not exclusively attributable to motherhood. Indeed, even controlling
for these factors fails to eliminate the wage gap that exists between the male and female
lawyers within the sample, suggesting that factors aside from women’s unequal share in
the duties of parenthood must be at play.
Furthermore, although a narrow representation of the workforce at large, these
cohorts had nearly identical levels of human capital, both in the form of education as well
as in work experience, providing strong evidence to suggest that disparities in workrelated skills and experience are not sufficient explanations for the gender wage gap in its
entirety. Indeed, having graduated from the same law school and having been educated
in nearly identical curriculums, these men and women had the same earning potential at
the point of graduation. In general, research concerning the effect of human capital on
the gender wage gap has led scholars to conclude that, although undoubtedly a factor in
wage disparities, human capital does not explain this phenomenon in its entirety.
Moreover, such evidence suggests that the human capital argument fails to get at the root
cause of gender-based wage disparities in the American workforce.
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COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Compensating wage differentials has been offered as another potential
explanation for the gender wage gap by a number of scholars. This explanation is based
on the assumption that women tend to place a greater value on less demanding and more
personally rewarding working conditions than men. Meanwhile, men place a greater
value on higher wages than favorable working conditions. Thus, men are “compensated”
for their less desirable working conditions by receiving higher wages and women are
“compensated” for their lower wages through the benefit of more advantageous working
conditions.
The compensating wage differentials argument has been thoroughly explored in
the work of Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) and Noonan, Corcoran, and Courant
(2005). Their work assesses whether women’s occupational choices are more heavily
dictated by perceived working conditions than those of men. For example, both cohorts
in the study by Noonan et al. demonstrated that women lawyers tend to favor different
areas of practice than those traditionally favored by male lawyers such as government
and legal services. Moreover, these areas typically offer more opportunities for human
interaction and may be characterized as more “personally rewarding” work settings than
those typically favored by men, such as large private firms (Noonan, Corcoran, and
Courant 2005). More specifically, their findings revealed that the areas which female
lawyers tend to prefer typically pay less and offer fewer opportunities for advancement
than those areas which are traditionally favored by men. For example, men in the earlier
cohort were more likely to be in private practice, have more years of work experience in
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private practice, and more likely to be partners in large firms, and were less likely to
work in the lower-paying areas of government and legal services than women in the
earlier cohort (Noonan et al. 2005). However, in the later cohort, sex differences in job
settings decreased; more women worked in private practice and business and fewer
worked in government, legal services, and as judges/professors (Noonan et al. 2005).
Additionally, women in the later cohort averaged nearly two years more experience in
private practice than those in the earlier cohort. Based on these downward trends in sex
differences in job settings, both Noonan et al. and Wood et al. were generally reluctant to
grant too much significance to compensating wage differentials as an explanation of
today’s gender wage gap. Both cite that women are becoming increasingly represented in
all areas of law, rather than being clustered into a few female-dominated specialties.
The concept of compensating wage differentials as an explanation for the wage
gap is further taken into question by the work of Jacobs and Steinberg (1990). These
researchers are particularly critical of the work of Randall Filer (1989), who argued that
female-dominated occupations are not underpaid when their preferable working
conditions are taken into consideration. According to Filer, women are much less likely
than men to work in physically taxing or potentially hazardous environments. The
research conducted by Jacobs and Steinberg (1990) is largely directed at undermining, if
not fully disproving, the conclusions of Filer’s research claiming that, “male-dominated
positions do not have a monopoly on undesirable working conditions” (Jacobs and
Steinberg 1990). In this study, unfavorable working conditions were characterized by
factors such as extreme heat or cold, cleaning others’ dirt, fumes, loud noise, strenuous
10

physical activity, risk of injury, contact with difficult clients, communication with the
public, stress, job autonomy, working with sick patients, repetition, unexpected problems,
and being told what to do. Ultimately, their research on a sample of New York state
employees revealed that undesirable working conditions were a burden to both men and
women in the workforce alike, and that little or no “compensation” for these conditions in
the form of wages was given to either sex.
The work of Lowell and Sicilian (2008) offers additional compelling evidence in
opposition to the compensating wage differentials argument. Their research seeks to
assess whether women’s wages are lower than men’s wages because they are more likely
to receive “family friendly” fringe benefits, such as paid parental leave, flexible work
schedules, child care, and sick leave. In other words, the study assesses whether women
are “compensated” for their lower wages by the advantages they receive due to their
status as a mother. They conducted a survey of 12,686 individuals in the American
workforce, interviewing them annually (biannually after 1994) starting in 1979 through
1998, in order to assess the fringe benefits that they received at their place of employment
(Lowell and Sicilian 2008). The study concluded that, although women were more likely
to receive family-friendly benefits than men, both men and women received familyneutral benefits at approximately the same rates. When controlling for the proportion of
an occupation that is occupied by females, gender does not appear to have a significant
impact on the likelihood of receiving fringe benefits, whether family friendly or
otherwise, with the exception of parental leave (Lowell and Sicilian 2008). Alternatively,
receipt of family-friendly fringe benefits was not shown to lower wages, either for
11

women or men. Moreover, the study revealed that receipt of fringe benefits of any kind
did not diminish the wages of women any more than those of men. Thus, Lowell and
Sicilian concluded that fringe benefits do not have a compensating wage effect and,
therefore, do not represent a valid explanation of gender wage disparities.
McCrate (2005) further criticized the compensating wage differential argument.
The study seeks to assess whether women’s lower wages are the result of their
concentration in jobs with flexible hours. Using data from the 1991 Comparative Project
in Class Analysis (CPCA), the study examines flexible hours as a compensating wage
differential for women in the U.S. workforce. The study concludes that, overall, women
do not have more flexible work schedules than men. In fact, the study finds that flexible
work schedules are positively correlated with positions of authority in the workplace,
which are traditionally dominated by men. Moreover, the study finds that, although when
controlling for industry, occupation, workplace authority, and selection on unobservables,
workers with flexible schedules do tend to earn lower wages. The study makes several
stipulations on these findings. First, McCrate notes the compensation for authority in the
workplace is much greater than compensation for inflexible schedules (McCrate 2005).
Thus, an individual in a powerful position, whether male or female, will earn higher
wages than an individual with inflexible work hours. Second, workers may not be fully
compensated for their inflexible work hours in the form of wages (McCrate 2005). Thus,
women who have inflexible work schedules may not be able to achieve sufficient wages
to compensate for this rigidity. Overall, the results of the study suggest that flexible
hours are not a compensating wage differential for women in the American workforce.
12

In general, much of the research surrounding the gender wage gap has suggested that
compensating wage differentials, although a potential contributor to wage disparities in
the American workforce, does not appear to explain the gap in its entirety. Much like the
preceding human capital argument, scholarly evidence suggests that the compensating
wage differentials argument fails to account for the root cause of the gender wage gap as
it exists in the American workforce today.
STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
Researchers have offered an additional explanation for the wage gap, suggesting
that women, which are more likely than men to be intermittently employed, may be
discriminated against at the point of employment as well as in terms of their opportunities
for promotion. According to England, “if women have higher turnover rates, and
employers know this, then based on this sex difference in turnover they may engage in
what economists call statistical discrimination” (England 1992). In particular, England
suggests that employers would be hesitant to hire women into positions for which
turnover is particularly costly, especially jobs that require a great deal of on-the-job
training. However, the work of England has also highlighted a number of weaknesses
within this hypothesis, citing that, overall, both men and women are more inclined to quit
jobs that are either low paying or offer few chances for advancement. Thus, rather than
high employment turnover rates among women being to blame for statistical
discrimination, perhaps women’s higher turnover rates are the result of their placement in
less desirable jobs through statistical discrimination.
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Moreover, it is worth noting that recent studies have shown minimal differences
in turnover rates between young men and women in the workforce. Therefore,
employers’ continued tendency to favor hiring men to positions that require considerable
on-the-job training cannot reasonably be attributed to statistical discrimination, instead
reflecting other gender-biased motivations. Indeed, much of the work of Noonan et al.
(2005) is aimed at testing the hypothesis that, as women are being introduced into
previously male-dominated professions, employers may predict female productivity on
the basis of inappropriate sex-based stereotyping. Consequently, employers might be
reluctant to hire and promote female employees. These researchers have further posited
that as women become more proportionately represented in these fields, sex will become
less of a consideration for employers (Noonan, Corcoran, and Courant 2005). From this
perspective it is entirely possible that, regardless of the role statistical discrimination has
purportedly played in the gender wage gap phenomenon, the negative implications of
such inappropriate stereotyping will eventually disappear as women become more
equally represented in the diversity of fields which constitute the American workforce.
In fact, other research suggests that the effects of statistical discrimination have
already been eliminated from the workplace. A study which collected data on blue-collar
and clerical employees within 16 U.S. industries along with employees in 10 professional
and administrative occupations, concluded that statistical discrimination or “within-job
wage discrimination” was not a plausible explanation for the gender wage gap that exists
today (Petersen and Morgan 1995). In their analysis, Petersen and Morgan concluded
that, when controlling for both occupation and establishment, the wage gap was
14

diminished to the point that there was hardly any difference between men and women
(Petersen and Morgan 1995). Thus, this hypothesis has also proven weak, with studies
suggesting that a combination of discriminatory forces both at the point of employment
as well as in the ways that women are channeled, or select themselves, into particular
occupations is more likely at fault for the wage gap than individualized discrimination on
the part of employers. Ultimately, intentional discrimination against women at the point
of employment, promotion, or in wage setting decisions is likely still taking place in the
American workforce today. This thesis does not presume that this is a problem that
cannot or should not be rectified. Rather, this thesis suggests that other factors play a
more dominant role in fostering the gender wage gap which endures in the American
workforce today and that, by addressing these central causes, future equal pay legislation
could more effectively bridge this gap.
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
Many researchers have pointed to another potential explanation for the wage gap
known as occupational segregation or occupational-establishment segregation. Indeed, it
has been suggested that unequal pay for equal work may only be partly to blame for the
perceivable gender wage gap; historically women have not occupied the same
occupations as men. According to the work of Kelly and Bayes (1988), “in 1981 four out
of every five women employed in the United States worked in 25% of the 420
occupations listed by the Department of Labor.”
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The work of Mary Huff Stevenson (1984) also followed this line of reasoning,
further suggesting that, not only are women largely confined to a narrow selection of
occupations, but these occupations also tend to pay less than other typically maledominated occupations. Stevenson defends this claim, citing the research of John
Buckley (1971), who concluded that “women tend to fare better (in terms of earnings) in
establishments where they have male occupational counterparts” (Buckley 1971, 36 as
cited in Stevenson 1984, 42). In fact, his studies revealed that men, who enjoyed an
overall wage advantage of 18%, experienced a wage advantage as great as 22% in
establishments that exclusively employed men. Meanwhile, in establishments employing
both men and women this wage advantage dropped to as low as 11%. Based on her
analysis of data collected by numerous scholars concerning the phenomenon of
occupational segregation, Stevenson’s work ultimately develops a model of male-female
wage differences based on the Edgeworth Bergmann “crowding hypothesis.” This
hypothesis attributes women’s lower wages to their concentration in relatively few
occupations. This “crowding” is anticipated to cause the supply of workers in those
particular occupations to be higher, resulting in driving down the wages due to decreased
demand.
Petersen and Morgan (1995) concluded that, particularly in the case of blue-collar
and clerical workers, occupational-establishment segregation was largely responsible for
the gender wage gap accounting for as much as 89% of the perceived wage gap within
their sample. Petersen and Morgan define the term occupational-establishment
segregation by breaking it down into two subsets of discrimination, allocative and
16

valuative. Allocative discrimination is based on the idea that women are typically
allocated to occupations or establishments that pay lower wages, suggesting that
discrimination exists at the point of hiring and in the probability that a woman will
receive a promotion (Petersen and Morgan 1995). In other words, from an allocative
perspective a woman’s lower wages is likely attributable to the fact that she is less likely
to be considered for a high-paying position than her male counterparts in the workforce
or, upon being employed, she is less likely than her male co-workers to be considered for
a promotion. Valuative discrimination refers to the idea that occupations held primarily
by women tend to be paid lower wages than those primarily held by men (Petersen and
Morgan 1995). Thus, from a valuative perspective, occupations such as nursing which
are traditionally dominated by women are likely to be paid lower wages than occupations
such as engineering which are traditionally dominated by men.
Cohen and Huffman (2003) offer further support for the occupational segregation
argument. Using data from a random sample of U.S. work establishments with
metropolitan-area data, the study seeks to assess whether the effect of occupational
segregation on female wage devaluation varies across the broader labor market, as
opposed to simply at the establishment level as supposed by previous research. The
findings of their research support their hypothesis that, “in labor markets with a relatively
high level of gender segregation…men are in a stronger position to benefit from [wage]
devaluation and women and less able to resist it.” The implications of their findings are
particularly significant in the sense that they expand the scope of occupational
segregation as an agent in the gender wage gap phenomenon, asserting that wage
17

devaluation in female-dominated occupations occurs not only on a micro-level, that is
from establishment to establishment, but also on macro-level within the broader labor
market.
Other research on the impact of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap
has broadened its focus to include not only the impact of female clustering in certain
occupations on wage, but also its impact on women’s career mobility in male-female
integrated work settings. Such research is illustrated by the work of Maume (1999),
which followed the careers of a sample of workers from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) for seven years in terms of occupational segregation. According to the
study, not only did men’s promotion chances in an occupation increase relative to the
percentage of males in the occupation, but also the probability of women leaving their
jobs increased relative to the percentage of males in the occupation. Interestingly, these
findings were confirmed even when controlling for factors such as human capital, family
characteristics, the skill requirements of occupations, exposure to dangerous working
conditions, and industrial sector of employment.
Overall, the findings of the study suggest that, although women do tend to earn
higher wages when employed in a male-dominated occupation, they do so at the
increased risk of leaving these jobs or having their career mobility, in the form of
promotion, hindered in relation to their male counterparts due to their “token” status. In
fact, the study asserts that, “men tend to monopolize the “best” jobs in the economy and
resent women’s presence as co-workers,” and express their resentment through
“performance pressures, social isolation, and stereotyping” (Maume 1999).
18

Undoubtedly, the effects of such resentment will have an indirect impact on overall
gender wage disparity trends by discouraging women from maintaining positions in
higher-paying male-dominated occupations and by putting them at a disadvantage in
terms of their upward career mobility within these occupations. Such studies serve to
strengthen the occupational segregation argument as a potential explanation of the gender
wage gap, indicating that the pervasive effects of occupational segregation extend beyond
its direct impact on wages in female versus male-dominated jobs.
SYNTHESIS
While differences in human capital, the argument of compensating wage
differentials, statistical discrimination, and occupational segregation have all been
suspected to play at least some role in the overall gender wage gap by one or more of the
many scholars who have examined this topic, the occupational segregation hypothesis is
arguably among the most enduring and empirically strong explanations for the gender
wage gap. Indeed, this argument has been defended by a number of scholars and from a
number of different perspectives. Not only have these studies shown that women tend to
be concentrated in a narrow set of occupations, but these occupations are also among the
lowest paying occupations. Moreover, scholarly research has shown that the devaluation
of women’s wages as a result of occupational segregation is so pervasive that the impact
is evident not only at the micro (establishment) level, but also at the macro (labor market)
level. Finally, even if a woman does attain a position in a male-dominated field for
which she is rewarded with higher wages, there is evidence to suggest that her “token”

19

status may encourage her to leave that position or hinder her career mobility relative to
her male counterparts in the workplace.
In conclusion, a considerable gender-based wage gap still exists within nearly all
occupational fields in the U.S., over four decades after the passage of the Equal Pay Act
of 1963. In response to this, scholars have taken an interest in the subject and have
attempted, through various statistical methods, to identify the causes of this phenomenon.
Among these potential explanations for the wage gap are the influence of human capital
disparities, compensating wage differentials, statistical discrimination, and occupational
segregation.
Now that we have subjected each of the potential explanations for the gender
wage gap which have been proposed by scholars to careful scrutiny, emerging with the
hypothesis that occupational segregation is the most viable explanation for the gender
wage gap as it exists today in the American workforce, we may now move to assessing
the policy implications of this assumption. In order to accomplish this aim, the following
chapters will hold the occupational segregation argument up to the many legislative
initiatives which have been aimed at addressing the gender wage gap, in the hopes of
identifying the relative strengths and weaknesses of each initiative in addressing the
gender wage gap. Since the cause of any problem should always be a foremost
consideration in how that problem should be addressed, we will assess the relative
success of each of these legislative initiatives in terms of how well they address
occupational segregation as a root cause of the gender wage gap.
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CHAPTER 3

THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963

The Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 was enacted as an Amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 which, among other provisions, had prohibited classifying
jobs and wages on the basis of age or sex and created a minimum wage for some job
categorizations (Ford 2006). The 1963 bill would take a step further in ending genderbased wage differentials, prohibiting unequal pay for women doing “equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions” (Equal Pay Act 1963). Among the major
pieces of legislation that have been aimed at addressing the gender wage gap, the EPA of
1963 was one of the most groundbreaking for its time. Yet, it is arguable that the bill still
failed to live up to its original intent. Moreover, in spite of this well-intentioned
legislative initiative, the gender wage gap has endured, bringing the overall effectiveness
of the EPA into question.
Since much of the language of the EPA is somewhat ambiguous, it is important to
define some of the key terms. Equal skill refers to experience, training, education, and
the overall ability required of the employee (Crampton, Hodge, and Mishra 1997). Equal
effort refers to the degree of mental and physical exertion required of the employee
(Crampton et al. 1997). Responsibility refers to the amount of accountability demanded
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of the employee (Crampton et al. 1997). Working conditions include environmental
factors, as well as potential workplace hazards (Crampton et al. 1997).
Originally, the wording of the EPA was intended to include the phrase “equal
pay” for “comparable work” (Ford 2006). The intention had been to create a commission
that would enforce, through government regulation, the equal compensation of men and
women for work determined to be of comparable worth, or requiring the same level of
skill (Ford 2006). Proponents fought for eighteen years before the EPA was successfully
passed in 1963. A bill called the “Women’s Equal Pay Act of 1945,” known more
commonly as the “Pepper-Morse Bill” after its congressional sponsors, was first
introduced to the 79th Congress in 1945. This bill differed substantially from the 1963
Act, calling for the creation of an Equal Pay Division within the Women’s Bureau that
would be responsible for administering the new law (Mutari, Figart, and Power 2001).
The 1945 bill also called for employers to maintain records or their employees by sex, job
classification, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment and would have
applied to all employers with 8 or more employees, who engaged in interstate commerce
(Mutari, Figart, and Power 2001). Each and every year following the introduction of the
Pepper-Morse Bill, at least one roughly equivalent equal pay bill was introduced in each
session of Congress until the passage of the EPA in 1963. Major changes to the nature of
this bill did not occur until the election of John F. Kennedy and a Democrat-controlled
Congress in 1962, after which the bill was successively “watered down” as proponents
changed its wording to gain congressional support (Mutari, Figart, and Power 2001).
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Ultimately, in order to ensure the successful passage of the bill, advocates were
forced to concede on the “equal pay for comparable worth” phrase, calling instead for a
bill which would require “equal pay for equal work.” Thus, in terms of occupational
segregation, the version of the bill that was successfully enacted into law only addresses
pay inequity in careers in which both men and women are employed, yet it fails to
address wage disparities among careers that are traditionally female-dominated in
comparison with careers that are traditionally male-dominated. Moreover, the “equal
pay for equal work” doctrine may have served to perpetuate occupational segregation in
the American workforce, by discouraging employers from hiring women. Previously, the
prospect of hiring women had been accompanied by the incentive that employers could
pay them less than male employees for the same work (Lens 2004). Following the EPA,
such practices became illegal and therefore employers lacked cheaper labor as a
motivation to employee women. Thus, the substitution of “equal pay for equal work” for
“equal pay for comparable work” is undoubtedly the most blatant shortcoming of the Act
in addressing occupational segregation as a root cause of the gender wage gap.
Additionally, the avenues by which women may file suit in these cases often
discourage them from taking legal action. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is
the fact that the women filing suit in these cases must bear the burden of proof. First, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant paid unequal wages to employees of the opposite
sex. Second, they must demonstrate that they each performed equal work on jobs which
require equal skill, effort, and responsibility. Finally, they must show that both jobs
operate under similar working conditions.
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Although the EPA does not require that the compared jobs be identical, merely
“substantially equal,” there is little clarification provided as to what this means.
According to Wyman (2003), the courts have often taken a narrow approach to
interpreting the “substantially equal” criteria, allowing employers to offer a number of
differences between the female employee and her male comparator to prevent the
plaintiff from establishing her case. For example, if the male comparator has more
employees over which he supervises or if he is responsible for a larger budget or market
share than the female, the courts have traditionally held that such jobs are not
substantially equal (Wyman 2003). Thus, unless the jobs which are being compared are
virtually identical, it is often impossible for female employees to successfully pursue a
wage inequality case under the EPA. In this way, the Act further fails to address
occupational segregation as a root cause of the gender wage gap. According to Quinn
(1994), these existing schemes for job evaluation under the EPA do not capture the
complexities of “women’s work” in comparison to “men’s work” and, therefore, the
substantially equal standard is too rigid to effectively address the gender wage gap.
Traditionally female-dominated occupations require different kinds of skill, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions than traditionally male-dominated jobs, a reality
for which the provisions of the EPA does not account (Quinn 1994). Therefore, since the
American workforce is highly segregated into female-dominated and male-dominated
jobs which often fall short of meeting such a strict “substantially equal” standard, the
average woman is unable to successfully attain redress for gender-based wage disparities
under the EPA.
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Due to the demanding burden of proof that is placed on employees filing suit in
EPA cases, very few pay inequality cases under the EPA are filed. In fact, from 1985 to
1997 only 164 cases were filed and only 251 lawsuits were resolved under the EPA
(Spizman 2001). Additionally, the economic costs for women filing suit in these cases
often outweigh the ultimate benefits. For instance, from 1985-1997 roughly 16 million
dollars were recovered in lawsuits under the EPA, a negligible amount when spread
across several lawsuits over a twelve year period (Spizman 2001). Not to mention, the
sheer length of these legal disputes often discourages or prevents women from being able
to see a case through to its resolution due to exorbitant legal fees, with even expedited
cases lasting as long as two-and- a-half years (Crampton, Hodge, and Mishra 1997).
Moreover, the EPA also outlined a number of exceptions to its “equal pay for
equal work” doctrine, making provisions for instances in which pay differentials would
be legally justified. These include cases in which employees are paid on the basis of a
“seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex” (Equal
Pay Act 1963). However, such exceptions only served to weaken the effectiveness of the
Act by providing legal justification for those employers who seek to rationalize
discriminatory practices.
Under the EPA, if a plaintiff does manage to establish the three previously stated
criteria, the burden of proof shifts to the employer (Spizman 2001). The employer must
then prove that the unequal pay resulted from one of the four aforementioned exceptions:
seniority, merit, productivity, or any other factor other than sex. According to Spizman
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(2001), the “any other factor other than sex” defense is one of the most commonly used
tactics by defendants in EPA wage discrimination cases, due to the fact that it is the most
broadly worded permitted factor outlined in the Act. Indeed, the statute does not define
this qualification or offer standards for what qualifies as a factor other than sex.
According to Whitley (1997), the “any other factor other than sex” provision of the EPA
has “proven the most contentious in litigation and the most pliable to clever defendants”
of the four affirmative defenses. For example, the courts have found differences in
education or experience between male and female coworkers to be acceptable
explanations for wage disparities (Wyman 2003). However, such a defense of wage
inequality still arguably represents some latent gender bias. Indeed, the different manner
in which our society socializes and channels young boys and girls into different levels of
education as well as different occupations may adversely influence their relative levels of
education and experience in the long run (Whitley 1997). When considered from this
perspective, education and experience may be perceived as less viable rationalizations for
gender-based wage differences. Additionally, although the courts have generally
frowned upon intangible factors such as market forces as explanations for unequal wages,
employers may offer the fact that a male employee earned higher wages in their previous
job as a rationalization for wage differences between male and female employees
(Wyman 2003). In this manner, the courts’ decisions may serve to perpetuate wage
disparities between men and women by upholding men’s superior earning potential
across occupations. Not only are such rationalizations unfair to women, but they can also
make pay discrimination cases particularly difficult to win for employees.
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In conclusion, there are many ways in which the EPA has failed to address
occupational segregation as a root cause of the gender wage gap. Most prominently, the
Act only provides for “equal pay for equal work” and therefore fails to address relative
wage disparities between female-dominated and male-dominated occupations. Moreover,
the burden of proof, particularly the “substantially equal” standard, has proven especially
difficult for women facing wage discrimination relative to their male coworkers to
surmount. Finally, the Act also provides several provisions for circumstances under
which wage inequalities may be legally justified. In particular, the “any other factor
other than sex” defense has often been the source of questionable rulings in gender-based
wage discrimination cases.
As you proceed into the following chapters of this thesis you will recognize that
much of the equal pay legislation to date has come about through an evolutionary
process. Each successive Act has been aimed at addressing the inherent weaknesses of
its predecessor. However, despite this incremental improvement, this thesis proposes that
each of these Acts still possesses weaknesses that prevent them from addressing
occupational segregation as a central cause of the gender wage gap, from the EPA in
1963 to the recent Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. Moreover, as you examine the
ineffectiveness of each of these legislative initiatives in addressing gender-based wage
disparities, it is arguable that none of these Acts represent a governing principal within
the American workforce. Instead, it may be argued that these Acts come nearer to
representing a philosophical or symbolic statement that, while seeking to pacify women
who experience unfair wage discrimination of the basis of their sex, carries little
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significance with respect to actually addressing the gender wage gap. At the conclusion
of this thesis we will explore some of the remedies which have been offered by scholars
as a means to produce more effective and enforceable equal pay legislation. The value of
each of these recommendations as well as their potential implications for the future of the
gender wage gap in the American workforce will be discussed in turn.
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CHAPTER 4

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

As the next piece of equal pay legislation following the passage of the EPA in
1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 took a step further in addressing the
gender wage gap. Indeed, the Act was much broader in the sense that it sought to
prohibit discrimination in a variety of areas including hiring, firing, compensation,
classification, promotion, and other employment decisions (Crampton, Hodge, and
Mishra 1997). Overall, this Act prohibited discrimination in these employment decisions
“with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
such an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (Civil Rights Act of
1964). However, there is evidence to suggest that this piece of legislation also contained
several inherent weaknesses which limited its effectiveness in addressing the gender
wage gap and, more specifically, occupational segregation.
It is well documented that the word “sex” was originally introduced for inclusion
in the 1964 Act as a joke and as a tactic to defeat or weaken the bill by splintering
interested parties in support of the bill (Deitch 1993). However, according to Deitch
(1993), despite the less than honorable intentions underlying the addition of this term,
“the inclusion of the word sex in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act became the legal
basis for most gender discrimination policy in the United States.” Indeed, it is arguable
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that the gains in gender-based wage inequality which have resulted in wage
discrimination cases under the Title VII were merely the unintended consequences
resulting from the passage of this legislation. Therefore, regardless of how effectively
this legislation has addressed occupational segregation as a cause of the gender wage gap,
the manner in which it came to fruition casts a shadow of doubt on its validity as a means
to address gender-based wage disparities.
Prior to the passage of the 1964 Act, a number of concerns arose regarding the
impact of this legislation on its predecessor, the EPA (Wyman 2003). Due to its broader
interpretation of employment discrimination, interested parties feared that an employee
filing suit under Title VII could file a wage discrimination claim without the need to
demonstrate “equal pay for equal work” as required under the EPA (Wyman 2003). As a
result, Congress incorporated the Bennett Amendment into the bill shortly before its
passage in 1964. This amendment effectively integrated the EPA’s four provisions for
circumstances under which gender-based wage inequalities would be legally justified into
Title VII, including “a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor
other than sex” (Equal Pay Act of 1963). The Bennett Amendment served to impose
many of the same limitations on Title VII in terms of its ability to address occupational
segregation as the EPA faced. In particular, by including these four affirmative defenses
for wage discrimination, Title VII became subject to the vast limitations arising from the
ambiguity of the “any other factor other than sex” provision of the EPA. As a result,
wage discrimination cases arising under this Act have been subjected to unfair
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rationalizations of pay disparities offered by employers and, subsequently, made
exceedingly more difficult to win for aggrieved employees.
Much like its legislative predecessor, the 1964 Act outlined circumstances under
which gender-based pay inequities would be legally justified in addition to those already
provided under the EPA. In particular, the act detailed a few protected traits classified as
Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications (BFOQ), over which an employer would still be
permitted to discriminate at the point of employment under this Act. According to the
Act, it is not unlawful for an employer to hire an individual on the basis of religion, sex,
or national origin in situations in which those factors constitute a bona fide occupational
qualification “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise” (Civil Rights Act of 1964). However, since men and women are largely
concentrated into male-dominated and female-dominated occupations, it is arguable that
such bona fide occupational qualifications could serve to discourage women from
entering traditionally male dominated fields by hindering their earning potential in those
fields (Quinn 1994). Thus, in this sense, the act fails to address occupational segregation
as a cause of the gender wage gap. In fact, the implications of the BFOQ provision of
Title VII may even serve to reinforce occupational segregation in the American
workforce.
Moreover, such provisions for cases in which gender-based wage disparities are
permitted provide employers additional means by which to rationalize unfair wages.
Indeed, the Act’s definition of what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification is
largely ambiguous and provides no mechanism by which to ensure the legitimacy of
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employers’ application of this principle. In fact, illegitimate claims by employers of
occupational qualifications as the basis for gender-based wage inequalities are unlikely to
be corrected unless an aggrieved female employee files a wage discrimination suit. This
is further complicated by the fact that female employees are unlikely to be aware of the
inferiority of their earnings relative to their male coworkers. In this manner, the Act also
falls short of addressing occupational segregation as a cause of the gender wage gap, by
discouraging women from entering traditionally male-dominated occupations.
Another limitation of the Act is that employees filing suit in wage discrimination
cases under Title VII, in addition to bearing the burden of proof as in the EPA, must also
prove that their employer acted with discriminatory intent (Wyman 2003). In this case,
discriminatory intent includes anything from malicious intent to stereotyped assumptions
and unconscious perceptions (Zimmer and Sullivan 1986). Thus, in these cases it is not
enough for an employee to demonstrate that she was paid less than her male coworkers
for doing the same work, she must also demonstrate that her employer did so
intentionally based on her sex. Thus, although Title VII takes a broader approach in
addressing wage discrimination in a number of areas, it also makes wage discrimination
cases more difficult to win for plaintiffs due to a more stringent burden of proof.
Additionally, although this Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) with the express purpose of enforcing and implementing the
prerogatives of the legislation, it failed to provide the commission with any mechanism
by which to ensure compliance with the Act. Indeed, the EEOC’s capacity to address
wage discrimination was impeded by inadequate enforcement powers, budgetary
32

limitations, and weak administration (Pedriana and Stryker 2004). For instance, the
EEOC’s capacity to enforce the Act was limited by the manner in which the Act called
for wage discrimination cases to originate, requiring that violations be brought to the
attention of the EEOC by the aggrieved party rather than allowing the EEOC to actively
seek out and address such unfair wage disparities. Thus, under this Act many women
may be experiencing unfair wage discrimination without their knowledge. Additionally,
although many women may be aware of the unfair wage discrimination to which they are
being subjected, they may not be aware of their rights to file suit in these cases.
In addition to the weaknesses of the EEOC under the provisions set forth by the
1964 Act, sources suggest that the EEOC has become increasingly ineffectual over time
due to ever-increasing caseloads and personnel shortages. Indeed, there is evidence to
suggest that the process of reaching a resolution in wage discrimination cases under the
EEOC is becoming increasingly lengthy, often spanning over a number of years.
According to Crampton, Hodge, and Mishra (1997), “the number of discrimination
charges [filed with the EEOC] increased by 46.7 percent between 1989 and
1994…however, resolutions of these complaints only increased by 9.6 percent; thus, the
process is slowing down.” Filing wage discrimination suits with the EEOC is further
complicated by a 13 percent decrease in EEOC investigators since 1989, accompanied by
the caseloads for individual investigators tripling over the same time period (Crampton,
Hodge, and Mishra 1997). Such statistics highlight the limitations of the EEOC in
addressing the gender wage gap.
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Yet another limitation of Title VII which has been offered by scholars is that,
although the Act addresses gender-based wage inequalities in contexts in which both men
and women work, the Act fails to address the source of occupational segregation.
According to Moss (2004), occupational segregation in the American workforce is
largely the result of women’s inherent preference for nondiscriminatory workplaces and
their tendency to select occupations on the basis of expectations of discrimination in a
given work environment. According to this theory, women anticipate discrimination in
male-dominated occupations due to an underrepresentation of women (Moss 2004). As a
result, women tend to favor gender-diverse occupations and, consequently remain largely
unrepresented in traditionally male-dominated fields. Such a cyclical process serves to
perpetuate occupational segregation in the American workforce. Therefore, the weakness
of Title VII in addressing occupational segregation lies in its failure to address the origin
of women’s expectations of discrimination in male-dominated occupations. Moss (2004),
suggests that future legislation should more directly address the cause of occupational
segregation by implementing changes in the “focus and the burdens of proof in Title VII
cases, affirmative action, and educational reform.” Such prescriptions for improved
equal pay legislation will be further discussed at the close of this thesis.
Other limitations of this Act include the short 180 day statute of limitations, after
which an aggrieved party may lose their right to file suit (Civil Rights Act of 1964). The
courts have often held that the statute of limitations begins at the time of employment
when wages were agreed upon rather than at the point at which discriminatory wages
were discovered by an aggrieved party (Bornstein 2009). Thus, under the 1964 Act it
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was possible that a woman could be subjected to unfair gender-based wage inequality
over the course of her employment and become aware of this 180 days after the point at
which she was hired, only to find that the statue of limitations had already been surpassed
and she no longer possessed legal recourse to file suit despite the fact that she is still
receiving unfair wages. This major weakness was only recently addressed in 2009 with
the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which effectively relaxed the 180 day
statute of limitations, an issue which will be covered in more depth later in this thesis.
Another shortcoming of Title VII is that it only applies to employers who employ
15 or more employees (Civil Rights Act of 1964). However, according to a recent newsrelease by the U.S. Small Business Administration (2006), “in 2005, small businesses
represented 99.7 percent of all the nation’s employer business…[employing] 57.4 million
Americans.” Thus, the Act only covers a small percentage of the businesses in the
American workforce, a majority of which are small businesses employing fewer than 15
people. In this way, the significance of this Act in addressing gender-based wage
inequality is further limited, since it only applies to a very small minority of employers in
the American workforce.
In conclusion, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 features a number of
inherent weaknesses which limit its ability to address occupational segregation and the
gender wage gap. In fact, it is arguable that many of the provisions in this act represent a
primarily symbolic statement, rather than a significant and effective attempt to address
the gender wage gap. Indeed, the intentions underlying the inclusion of the word “sex” in
this piece of legislation alone are indicative of the shortcomings of the Act. Perhaps most
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strikingly, the inclusion of the four affirmative defenses of the EPA through the Bennett
Amendment, as well as the addition of Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications as
additional circumstances under which gender-based wage inequalities would be legally
justified, served to weaken the effectiveness of this Act. Also, the more stringent burden
of proof placed on employees filing wage discrimination suits under this Act, requiring
them to prove discriminatory intent on the part of their employers, further undermined the
ability of a plaintiff to achieve a favorable resolution in court. Moreover, the weaknesses
of the EEOC as an agency responsible for enforcing the prerogatives of this Act also limit
the effectiveness of this Act. Additionally, it is arguable that this act fails to address the
causes of occupational segregation and, therefore, fails to address the gender wage gap as
it exists today. Finally, the short statute of limitations, along with the limited
applicability of this Act within the American workforce, further diminishes its value as a
solution to gender-based wage inequalities.
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CHAPTER 5

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

Following its passage, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was widely recognized as a
major victory for the cause of wage equality. This Act was inspired by several goals. In
general, it sought to amend its legislative predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Additionally, it sought to overturn a number of previous Supreme Court decisions in
employment discrimination by “restoring the civil rights protections that were
dramatically limited by those decisions” (Civil Rights Act of 1991). Moreover, the Act
aimed to “strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal civil rights
laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of
discrimination” (Civil Rights Act of 1991). Although a number of legislative initiatives
with regard to employment discrimination were passed since the passage to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the 1991 Act was the first statutory initiative to specifically address
gender-based inequalities with regard to wages since its legislative predecessor nearly 30
years before. In spite of the many provisions for gender-based wage disparities which
this Act offered it is arguable that, like its legislative predecessors, the 1991 Act also fell
short of addressing the gender wage gap and, more specifically, occupational segregation
as a cause of this gap.
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Among the major provisions brought about by this Act was that it significantly
lightened the plaintiff’s burden of proof in disparate impact cases. According to Lissy
(1992), a disparate impact occurs when an employment policy or practice
“disproportionately and adversely” affects an individual. Previously the courts had
routinely ruled in favor of employers in wage discrimination cases due to the excessively
harsh burden of proof faced by plaintiffs in these cases (Seymour 1992). Under the new
act, if an employee can demonstrate that an employment policy or practice has a disparate
impact on female employees then the burden of proof shifts to the employer. At this
point, the employer must demonstrate that the employment practice in question
constitutes a “business necessity” in relation to the position at issue (Lissy 1992).
However, in spite of the advantages of this provision of the Act for women filing wage
discrimination cases, it is arguable that the ambiguity of the term “business necessity” in
the Act limits the ability of women to reach favorable resolutions in wage discrimination
cases.
Indeed, the Act offers only a very broad and ambiguous definition of this term.
Therefore, the employment practices which employers may classify as business
necessities virtually are limitless, allowing a great deal of room for rationalizing
otherwise unfair and unjust wage disparities. For example, an employer may offer height
as a business necessity for a job the performance of which may or may not be impacted
by one’s height. Likewise, an employer may require that employees be able to lift a
certain amount of weight for a job the performance of which may or may not be impacted
by strength. Although seemingly exaggerated in their implications, these are instances of
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job stipulations that are not precluded as constituting a “business necessity” under this
Act; such limitations may, either overtly or subtly, serve to prevent women from being
hired or promoted into certain positions. As Quinn (1994) argues, such justifications, if
applied at the point of employment, may ultimately serve to limit women’s access to
traditionally male-dominated occupations and to limit women’s earning potential once
they are hired into such positions. As a result, occupational segregation and,
subsequently, the gender wage gap as a whole may be reinforced.
This Act also amended the statute of limitations implemented by the 1964 Act in
cases in which wage discrimination resulted from a seniority system. Previously, the 180
days allotted to file suit with the EEOC in cases of wage discrimination began at the point
at which a seniority system was adopted (Seymour 1992). Thus, women who were hired
180 days following the implementation of a seniority system and who were subsequently
discriminated against as a result of the system possessed no recourse to challenge the
discrimination. In this manner, intentionally discriminatory seniority systems could be
perpetuated under the previous Act. Under the 1991 Act, women are allowed to
challenge intentionally discriminatory seniority systems at the point at which they are
adopted, when they become subject to them, or when they become injured by their
application (Seymour 1992).
However, despite the fact that this Act eased the statute of limitations in regards
to seniority systems it still failed to address the statute of limitations in regards to the
other three affirmative defenses set forth in the EPA as well as in the Bennett
Amendment of the 1964 Act which include: “a merit system, a system which measures
39

earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor
other than sex” (Equal Pay Act of 1963). Indeed, it is arguable that these three
stipulations could also lead to the perpetuation of discriminatory employment practices as
a result of an unnecessarily strict statute of limitations beginning at the point of
implementation. Additionally, these stipulations could also provide convenient
rationalizations for employers seeking to justify discriminatory employment practices.
The 1991 Act also differs from its legislative predecessors in that it allows women
who sue on the basis of wage discrimination to collect punitive and compensatory
damages in cases of intentional discrimination. In this case, punitive damages refer to
damages paid with the intention of deterring intentionally harmful employment practices,
whereas compensatory damages refer to those losses for which the injured party is
entitled to be compensated (Lichtman and Fechner 1992). However, it is arguable that
what this Act grants with one hand in the form of provision for damages in wage
discrimination cases, it also takes away with the other. Indeed, the Act places strict limits
on the amount and accessibility of damages women may receive in these cases. As a
result, many women who face gender-based wage discrimination may receive little or no
compensation under this Act, regardless of how egregious the wage disparities they faced
and no matter how malevolent their employers intentions in inflicting the disparity.
According to Lichtman and Fechner (1992), the caps on damages set forth by the
Act are largely arbitrary, being based on employer size. For employers of 15 to 100
employees-which represent the vast majority of employers covered by this Act-the
damages cap is set at $50,000. The cap gradually ascends from here reaching $100,000
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for employers of 101-200 employees, $200,000 for employers of 201-500 employees, and
$300,000 for employers of 500 or more employees. In fact, the most that any employer
could ever be liable for under this Act is $300,000 in damages (Lichtman and Fechner
1992). Thus, in cases in which women have incurred substantial losses as a result of
wage discrimination, this Act could prevent them from recovering the full amount of their
losses. Additionally, like its predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1991 Act’s
terms for damages in wage discrimination cases exclude women who are employed in
businesses that employ fewer than 15 employees. Thus, as previously mentioned, the
majority of the women in the American workforce could not enjoy the advantages of
compensation for gender-based wage discrimination that this Act purportedly provides.
Another limitation in regards to the Act’s provision for damages is that punitive
damages may only be recovered if the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that their employer
acted with “malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights” (Lichtman and
Fechner 1992). Thus, the burden of proof lies heavily with the employee who filed suit
in these cases if they are to receive damages. As a result of the proceeding stipulations,
not only are the majority of women in the American workforce unlikely to be eligible to
recover damages in wage discrimination cases, but they also face the additional challenge
of proving unethical discriminatory intent on the part of their employer.
Other research cites unintended negative consequences of the provisions for
damages in wage discrimination cases set forth by the 1991 Act. According to Taylor
(2003), the risk of being liable for large damage rewards in wage discrimination cases
may have the inadvertent effect of discouraging employers from hiring women. Indeed,
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according to a study by Oyer and Schaefer (2005), analyzing industry hiring practices and
associated legal costs before and after the passage of the 1991 Act indicated that the Act
had halted and potentially reversed a trend toward industries becoming more integrated
on the basis of gender during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Oyer and Schaefer
(2005), the 1991 Act discouraged employers from hiring women by leading them to
conclude that the surest way to avoid a wage discrimination lawsuit and costly legal fees
was to avoid hiring individuals protected under the law. In this way, the 1991 Act could
potentially serve to reinforce occupational segregation in the American workforce.
Therefore, in addition to damages being particularly hard for women to attain in wage
discrimination cases, the threat of damages could potentially serve to perpetuate the
gender wage gap in the American workforce.
This Act also sought to “clarify prohibition against impermissible consideration of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices” (Civil Rights Act of
1991). Prior to the passage of this Act, the courts had regularly failed to hold employers
liable for discriminatory employment practices when employers identified other
legitimate factors motivating their otherwise discriminatory employment practices
(Bornstein 2009). Under the 1991 Act, discrimination need not be the sole motivating
factor behind an unlawful employment practice. Therefore, employers may be held liable
for wage discrimination under this Act even if other legitimate considerations played a
role in their employment policy.
In fact, the “mixed motive” doctrine of the 1991 Act allows an employer to be
held liable for discriminatory employment practices even when they admit that they
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would have acted similarly in the absence of any discriminatory considerations (Federal
Statutes and Regulations 2003). Thus, once a plaintiff is able to establish that
discriminatory motives on the part of their employer exist, liability is difficult for an
employer to counter (Federal Statutes and Regulations 2003). However, this provision is
also weak in the sense that it limits a plaintiff’s ability to recover punitive damages in
wage discrimination cases. Under this Act, a plaintiff may not receive punitive damages
if an effectively discriminatory employment practice is shown to be motivated by
legitimate factors in addition to discriminatory considerations (Bornstein 2009). Thus, if
an employer is able to prove that an employment practice which had the impact of
discriminating against an employee on the basis of gender was motivated by legally
justifiable rationale, even if discriminatory factors also played a role, they may not be
liable to pay punitive damages. Therefore, even if a plaintiff is able to establish
discriminatory intent on the part of her employer, she may still be ineligible to receive
damages for her losses as a result of unfair wage discrimination.
In conclusion, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 fails to effectively address the gender
wage gap, particularly in regards to occupational segregation. Once again, a number of
the provisions of this Act possess merely symbolic significance as opposed to
representing a serious attempt to address the gender wage gap. Indeed, the Act’s
ambiguous definition of a “business necessity” in wage discrimination cases offers
rationalization for employers seeking to justify unfair wage disparities and serves to
reinforce occupational segregation. Likewise, by not applying the broader statute of
limitations to the other three affirmative defenses in wage discrimination cases, the Act
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may also offer convenient justification for employers as well as a means to perpetuate
occupational segregation. The Act’s effectiveness is further undermined by the numerous
limitations it places on the extent and accessibility of damages women may receive in
wage discrimination cases. Moreover, the threat of damages liability may inadvertently
discourage employers from hiring women and, as a result, contribute to occupational
segregation. Finally, although the Act makes it more difficult for employers to counter
liability for unlawful employment practices once the plaintiff has established
discriminatory motive, it limits women’s eligibility for damages in “mixed motive”
circumstances.
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CHAPTER 6
THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009
Among the most recent legislative initiatives aimed at addressing the gender wage
gap is the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act which was passed in January of 2009. This piece
of legislation is named after Lilly Ledbetter, an Alabama woman who filed a complaint
with the EEOC after being paid less than her male co-workers at a Goodyear tire factory.
The complaint ultimately culminated in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
(2007), in which the Supreme Court decided in a 5-4 vote to overturn the decision of the
lower court, which had sided with Ledbetter’s claim of a violation of her rights under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court decision was in favor of
Goodyear, declaring that the 180 day statute of limitations for presenting a wage
discrimination lawsuit begins at the time of employment, when wages are agreed upon,
rather than restarting at the date of the most recent paycheck (Stolberg 2009).
In light of this judicial decision, which represented a major setback for the cause
of wage equality, the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act is a major turning point. This bill
effectively overturns the 2007 Supreme Court decision, by expanding the rights of
workers to sue in wage discrimination cases and effectively relaxing the statute of
limitations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to the wording of
the Act, the findings of the court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (2007)
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“ignore the reality of wage discrimination and [are] at odds with the robust application of
the civil rights laws that Congress intended (Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009). Many
have heralded this Act as a major victory for advocates of wage equality, including the
EEOC as well as women such as Lilly Ledbetter who have received unfair wages as a
result of their gender. Interestingly, this was the first bill signed into law by President
Obama, having faced opposition by the Bush administration following its previous
passage in Congress (Stolberg 2009).
This Act took a step further than its legislative predecessor in easing the statute
of limitations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to the wording
of the Act:
An unlawful employment practice occurs…when a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid,
resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice (Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009).
Therefore, under this Act employees may file claims of gender-based wage
discrimination up to 180 days following the receipt of the most recent paycheck or other
benefit allegedly affected by discriminatory motives on behalf of their employer (“EEOC
Revises Pay Bias Manual”). In fact, in the wake of the enactment of this Act, the EEOC
revised its Pay Bias Manual to better align with the new policy, relaxing the statute of
46

limitations so greatly as to allow employees to file compensation discrimination charges
as long as 300 days following the receipt of the most recent discriminatory paycheck or
employment benefit (“EEOC Revises Pay Bias Manual”). Additionally, this Act also
applies retroactively, allowing for recovery of back pay for up to two years before
charges of discriminatory compensation practices were filed. However, in spite of the
many advantages for pay equity which this Act offers, it is arguable that there are still
several inherent weaknesses which arguably prevent this Act from effectively addressing
the gender wage gap, and occupational segregation as a key source of the gap. Indeed,
upon closer analysis of this Act (which purportedly aims to prevent discrimination in
compensation because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) one may discover
that it will have a limited impact on the gender wage gap as it exists today.
Following the passage of this Act, a number of concerns arose surrounding its
implications for the business world. Many were concerned that the relaxed statute of
limitations would result in a flood of wage discrimination cases based on discriminatory
gender-based wage inequalities experienced by employees both in the past and in the
present (Greenwald 2010). However, recent judicial trends indicate that this did not
come to pass and that, in fact, the courts have generally been conservative in interpreting
the new law (Greenwald 2010). Furthermore, recent court decisions have demonstrated
that lower courts have the potential to lessen the impact of the broadened limitations
period imposed by this act in wage discrimination cases (Sorock 2010). Thus, women
filing suit in wage discrimination cases have generally been no more likely to achieve a
favorable outcome on their behalf as a result of this Act.
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Additionally, it has been speculated that, although the threat of costly litigation as
a result of this Act may have motivated many employers to conduct more audits of their
pay practices and to be more diligent in their recordkeeping efforts, this does not
necessarily mean that more cases will be filed (“What Has Changed Since Enactment of
Lilly Ledbetter?”). According to Bastian (2009), employees are typically unaware of
their co-workers earnings and how pay decisions are made by their employers. Thus,
many employees who are subjected to unfair wage disparities are unlikely to file a
complaint even within the extended statute of limitations simply because of a lack of
transparency of employment practices. This illustrates a key weakness in this Act in
addressing the gender wage gap; the Act does not provide any provisions for increasing
transparency of employment practices within businesses in order to enable women to
challenge discriminatory wages. According to O’Neill (2010), pay secrecy-andconfidentiality (PSC) rules are quite common in the American workforce. Indeed, a
recent online poll indicated that over one-third of respondents had formal PSC rules in
effect at their place of employment and only 1 in 14 respondents reported that their place
of employment had adopted a “pay openness” policy (O’Neill 2010). Moreover, O’Neill
(2010) was quick to point out that this poll likely failed to account for an untold number
of businesses that communicate wage confidentiality expectations informally. Likewise,
the Act only challenges unfair compensation practices when employees are aware of
them and file suit, the Act does not provide any mechanism by which businesses may be
regularly audited to ensure fair pay practices and to enable women to file suit when they
are subjected to discriminatory wages (“How to Play Fair Pay”).
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Perhaps the most important limitation of this Act which has been set forth is that
its scope, which only addresses the statute of limitations in wage discrimination cases, is
too narrow and limited (“How to Play Fair Pay”). Indeed, certain employment practices,
such as promotions, have been shown to be unprotected by this Act (“Promotions Don’t
Count as Pay Discrimination in Ledbetter Law”). Thus, an employee who is denied a
promotion on the basis of their sex may not be legally protected by this Act. In fact,
according to a recent report, this Act does not reinforce any of the provisions originally
set forth by the EPA, nor does it amend the EPA in any way (“How to Play Fair Pay”).
Therefore, this act “does not require equal pay for equal work, nor does it enact any
requirements that relate to how employees are paid or which prohibit discrimination in
pay,” it simply extends that statute of limitations in compensation discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“How to Play Fair Pay”). Indeed, it is
arguable that this Act in no way addresses occupational segregation as a root cause of the
gender wage gap. In fact, recent reports suggest that the wage gap has only shown
negligible improvement since 2008 across all 50 states, with women earning 23 cents less
than their male counterparts (Tucker 2010). On average, this loss in wages amounts to
$11,000 per year (Tucker 2010). Even more strikingly, women in 20 states experienced a
widened wage gap (Tucker 2010). Such evidence speaks to the ineffectiveness of this
Act as well as the necessity for further legislative intervention in the cause of wage
equality.
In sum, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act represents another feeble and virtually
ineffectual attempt to address the gender wage gap through legislative intervention.
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Indeed, the significance of this act is primarily symbolic in that, while it extends the
statute of limitations under Title VII, it fails to provide increased transparency in business
practices to ensure that women are not unknowingly being subjected to unfair wages or to
provide a mechanism through which employers may be routinely audited to ensure fair
pay practices. Moreover, the scope of this Act is so limited that it fails to address
arguably the most prominent cause of the gender wage gap as it exists today,
occupational segregation.
As you can see, the legislative initiatives which have been aimed at addressing
wage inequality in the American workforce have largely come about as a result of an
evolutionary process of trial and error. Each successive act has aimed to amend to
shortcomings of its predecessor. However, in spite of this gradual advancement over the
course of nearly half a century, it is questionable as to whether any of these Acts
effectively address the gender wage gap and its primary causes, particularly occupational
segregation. As we move to the conclusion of this thesis we will examine what scholars
have proposed as remedies for the seeming ineffectiveness of past equal pay legislation in
addressing the gender wage gap. Each of these recommendations will be assessed in
terms of their validity as well as their potential implications for the future of the gender
wage gap.
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CHAPTER 7
THE FUTURE OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE
Having examined a succession of legislative initiatives aimed at addressing the
gender wage gap up to the present, it is logical to discuss what lies ahead for the gender
wage gap. In response to the shortcomings of each of these legislative initiatives, as well
as the gender wage gap as it exists today, scholars have offered a number of prescriptions
for how legislative intervention could better be directed toward closing this gap. In
particular, a number of scholars have focused on the possibility of narrowing the gender
wage gap through legislative initiatives explicitly aimed at addressing occupational
segregation as a root cause of the gender-based wage disparities in the American
workforce. Additionally, a number of scholars have proposed ways in which the equal
pay legislation which has been passed to date could be amended and strengthened to
better address wage disparities.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EQUAL PAY LEGISLATION
A number of the recommendations for future equal pay legislation feature
measures which would require the federal government to take a much more hands-on
approach to decreasing occupational segregation and ensuring wage parity. According to
Hegewisch, Liepmann, Hayes, and Hartmann (2010), addressing the gender wage gap
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would be greatly facilitated by the creation of a federal agency dedicated to training and
employment programs targeted at young women to promote their interest in traditionally
male-dominated occupations. Such a program would actively seek to lower barriers to
women entering non-traditional fields by creating opportunities for women to enter into
professions that are traditionally occupied by males and by counteracting the manner in
which women are typically socialized to view their role in the American workforce.
Similarly, Hartmann and Rose (2004) have proposed that future equal pay legislation
should aim to implement and enforce educational policies to increase women’s presence
in higher paying occupations by increasing women’s access to skills training for
traditionally male-dominated occupations, as well as improving career counseling for
women. Hartmann and Rose further suggest that these resources should be specifically
targeted at young women who have not yet entered the workforce, as well as low-income
and single mothers who would stand to benefit most from such policies in the long-run.
Likewise, Goldberg-Dey and Hill (2007) have also proposed education as a key
component in overcoming occupational segregation. According to Goldberg-Dey and
Hill (2007), equal pay legislation should implement policies to promote careers in
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics in a manner which appeals to young
girls and women alike. The importance of catering specifically to women in the
promotion of male-dominated careers is further evidenced by the work of Weinberger
(2004) which suggests that women often avoid math and science related majors in
college, and subsequently careers in those fields, because they perceive them as being
“uninteresting.” Additionally, Goldberg-Dey and Hill (2007) propose that policies
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should be implemented to encourage young girls to start taking higher level math and
science courses early in their education. Indeed, such early exposure to these disciplines
has been shown to increase the likelihood that women will take similar courses in college
and, likewise, pursue careers in these fields as they enter the workforce (Trusty 2002).
Thus, by actively intervening and encouraging young women to pursue occupations other
than those typically dominated by females through training and education, such
legislation could greatly decrease occupational segregation in the American workforce
and, subsequently, the gender wage gap as a whole.
Indeed, not only are women greatly underrepresented within traditionally maledominated occupations, but these occupations also tend to offer higher wages than
traditionally female-dominated occupations (Boraas and Rodgers 2003). Thus,
introducing women into these fields represents a formidable accomplishment, both in
terms decreasing occupational segregation as well as in addressing the overall gender
wage gap. However, statistics suggest that women’s integration into male-dominated
fields has been slow to progress. According to Blum (1991), women experienced only
limited gains in their representation in traditionally male-dominated occupations from the
1970s into the 1980s, representing only 6.5 percent of total growth in female
employment. Moreover, many female-dominated jobs became even more heavily
occupied by females during this time (Blum 1991). Additionally, as previously
mentioned, women’s integration into male-dominated fields was further compromised as
a result of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. According to Oyer and Schaefer
(2005), the 1991 Act discouraged employers from hiring women for fear of costly legal
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expenses in the event of a gender discrimination lawsuit. Thus, equal pay legislation to
date has generally been ineffective in introducing women into traditionally maledominated occupations, this constitutes a major weakness which future equal pay
legislation should seek to address.
REVISING AND STRENGTHENING PREVIOUS EQUAL PAY LEGISLATION
Other scholars have proposed that the gender wage gap would be more effectively
addressed if previous legislation were revised and strengthened. Indeed, many scholars
have suggested that such reassessment could potentially lead to more effective legislation
and, in some instances, legislation that would better address occupational segregation as a
root cause of the gender wage gap. Upon reviewing the preceding critique of the
succession of equal pay legislation which has been passed to date, one may note the
emergence of several recurring weaknesses. Among these are the ambiguity of certain
passages within these acts, the provision for conditions under which gender-based wage
disparities would be legally justified, excessively harsh burdens of proof on behalf of the
employee filing suit in wage discrimination cases, and the limited applicability of these
legislative initiatives. As previously discussed, all of these weaknesses serve to
undermine the efficacy of these legislative initiatives in ensuring fair wages and greatly
diminish their significance as legitimate protections for women’s rights in the American
workforce. Indeed, it is arguable that the legislative initiatives aimed at addressing the
gender wage gap to date are merely symbolic in their significance.
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Ambiguity has been a weakness attributed to the EPA as well as the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1991. This ambiguity is arguably attributable to the fact that
implementing policy without the provision of exceptions and “wiggle room” is generally
politically unpalatable. Indeed, the concession of the phrase “equal pay for comparable
worth” in favor of “equal pay for equal work” in order to ensure the successful passage of
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 is a testament to the impact of political forces on
policymaking. According to Spizman (2001), this political preference for ambiguity in
policy is further illustrated by the four affirmative defenses, in particular the “any other
factor other than sex” provision, set forth in the EPA and carried over to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 through the Bennett Amendment. Other examples of these include the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as the
“business necessity” provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Such ambiguities often
allow employers to legitimize otherwise discriminatory pay practices by outlining
circumstances in which gender-based wage disparities are legally justified. Perhaps most
importantly, scholars have suggested that such justifications may have the unintentional
impact of reinforcing occupational segregation in the American workforce by limiting
women’s access to traditionally male-dominated occupations (Quinn 1994).
Another recurring weakness of the equal pay legislation which exists today is that
they generally place the burden of proof with the employee filing suit in wage
discrimination cases rather than with the employer. Furthermore, this burden of proof
has often proven to be excessively harsh in many cases. This is well demonstrated by the
EPA, which requires that an employee establish that unequal wages were paid to
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employees of the opposite sex for “substantially equal” work, operating under similar
working conditions (Equal Pay Act of 1963). This burden was made even more
burdensome in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which requires that employees not only bear
the same burden of proof as in the EPA, but they must also establish discriminatory intent
on the part of their employer (Wyman 2003). Although this burden of proof was
somewhat lightened by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers still face an unduly
heavy burden of proof in wage discrimination cases if they are to receive damages in
wage discrimination cases under this Act. By placing such a heavy burden of proof on
women in wage discrimination cases, the equal pay legislation which has been passed to
date makes it difficult for women to achieve favorable outcomes before the courts.
Moreover, even when a woman can demonstrate that gender-based wage disparities are
present, she is only entitled to recover damages for her losses when she can establish
discriminatory intent on behalf of her employer; yet another limitation women face as a
result of a heavy burden of proof.
Perhaps the failure of previous equal pay legislation which has most directly
impacted the pursuit of gender-based wage equality has been the manner in which it has
arbitrarily and systematically inhibited women’s eligibility to file suit as well as their
entitlement to proper reparation for their losses as a result of gender-based wage
discrimination. These limitations include, but are not limited to, strict statutes of
limitations, caps on the recovery of damages, and the limited applicability of these acts
based on employer size. Although the statute of limitations in wage discrimination cases
has become successively more relaxed since the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964
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to the Lilly Ledbetter Act of 2009, it is arguable that any statute of limitations which may
be placed on a woman’s right to file suit as a result of wage discrimination may be
considered arbitrary. Indeed, at what point does a woman no longer possess legal
recourse after being subjected to unfair wage practices? More importantly, how can
equal pay legislation effectively enact such limitations without arbitrarily excluding some
women from being eligible to file suit in these cases?
Another provision in previous equal pay legislation which has been the target of a
great deal of criticism are the caps on damages enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
According to Lichtman and Fechner (1992), these caps also represent an arbitrary
limitation on women’s rights before the law. In fact, one may rightfully question how the
compensation to which a woman who has been the victim of gender-based wage
discrimination has anything to do with the size of her employer. Finally, it is arguable
that, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which applied only to employers
who hire 15 or more employees, equal pay legislation has systematically excluded a
majority of women in the American workforce from being able file suit in wage
discrimination cases. Indeed, as previously discussed, the vast majority of women in the
American workforce work for in small business employing fewer than 15 people
(McDowell 2006).
Similarly, scholars have also suggested that stricter enforcement of equal pay
legislation by the EEOC would hasten the narrowing of the gender wage gap. According
to Pedriana and Stryker (2004), the EEOC faces a number of challenges which limit its
effectiveness in addressing sex-based wage disparities, including inadequate enforcement
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powers, budgetary limitations, and weak administration. However, perhaps the most
blatant weakness of the EEOC in its ability to address gender-based wage disparities is
that it was created without any mechanism by which it might actively seek out and
correct unfair wage practices within the American workforce. Indeed, wage
discrimination must be brought to the attention of the EEOC by an aggrieved party. This
problem is further compounded by the fact that many women are unaware of how their
wages compare to those of their male co-workers (Bastian 2009).
This brings us to yet another weakness of the EEOC, it offers no provisions for
increasing transparency in employment practices. Such provisions are arguably vital for
the EEOC to more effectively address the wage gap as it exists today. This is particularly
the case if the EEOC continues to operate as it does today, lacking the authority to
oversee the wage practices exercised by employers or to hold employers accountable for
unfair wage practices that are brought before the EEOC by any other avenue than an
employee initiating a wage discrimination suit. According to O’Neill (2010), future
equal pay legislation should directly address this problem, making pay secrecy-andconfidentiality (PSC) rules illegal, providing civil penalties for violations, allowing
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages, establishing “pay openness” policies in all
workplaces, and extending protections to both supervisory and non-supervisory
employees from disciplinary action as a result of wage disclosure. Ultimately, the
protections of equal pay legislation to date cannot be fully enjoyed by women in the
American workforce until these barriers to wage disclosure are overcome. Women

58

should be able to know how their wages compare to those of their male coworkers as a
matter of right, so that they may challenge unfair gender-based wage discrimination.
Furthermore, other scholars have suggested that internal weaknesses within the
EEOC present a more serious threat to the effectiveness of the EEOC in achieving its
purpose. According to Lichtman and Fechner (1992), as recently as the passage of the
Civil Rights Act in 1991 the EEOC has proven to be increasingly less effective than in
the past, with favorable settlements declining, no-cause findings increasing, alarmingly
incomplete cases becoming the norm, and examples of staff incompetence and hostility to
plaintiffs becoming widespread. For instance, whereas 32 percent of all new pay
inequality charges filed with the EEOC in 1980 resulted in settlement, only 14 percent of
such cases resulted in settlement in the 1990s (Lichtman and Fechner 1992).
Additionally, the EEOC has largely reduced its accessibility and accountability to the
public, with open forum meetings being held less frequently than at the peak of EEOC
enforcement in the 1980s (Lichtman and Fechner 1992). Thus, not only has the EEOC
proven to be less effective in ensuring favorable outcomes for women filing suit in wage
discrimination cases, but it has also made it increasingly more difficult for women to file
suit in these cases. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the changes which would be
necessary to improving the effectiveness of the EEOC would require considerable
funding and, considering the budgetary restraints faced by the majority of governmental
agencies today, such changes are unlikely to be undertaken in the near future.
In conclusion, this thesis has offered a comprehensive picture of the gender wage
gap as it exists today in the American workforce, with special attention being directed
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toward identifying and expounding upon what is arguably its prevailing cause,
occupational segregation. As demonstrated by the preceding chapters, the equal pay
legislation which has been enacted to date has largely fallen short of addressing
occupational segregation and, subsequently, the gender wage gap as a whole. This thesis
offers a synthesis of the scholarly recommendations which have been offered in response
to these shortcomings, focusing specifically on how future legislation could better
address occupational segregation as a root cause of the gender wage gap. Overall, there
is still a great deal of room for improvement in terms of future equal pay legislation. All
of the prescriptions for future equal pay legislation detailed in this chapter share a
common thread, that legislation aimed at addressing the gender wage gap should be
effective, enforced, and more than simply symbolically significant. Although
occupational segregation is not the only cause of the gender wage gap, it does represent a
dominant factor contributing to the gender wage gap as it exists today. However, this is
not intended to give the impression that intentional wage discrimination no longer exists.
Indeed, the recent Lilly Ledbetter case is just one of many instances offering evidence to
the contrary. However, this thesis proposes that addressing occupational segregation
through legislative intervention offers an opportunity to greatly diminish the gender wage
gap which continues to endure in the American workforce to this day. Furthermore, this
thesis suggests that the legislation which has previously passed to address gender-based
wage disparities will require extensive amendments in order to become a more effective
means to address the gender wage gap, as opposed to simply representing a symbolic
gesture on behalf of women’s rights as equal participants in the workforce.
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In the end, it is important to recognize that the aim of this thesis is not without its
limitations. Indeed, full gender wage parity may be impossible to achieve by legislative
means. It is entirely possible that, whether due to the forces of socialization and culture
or merely by virtue of biological affinity, women in the American workforce will
naturally continue to favor certain jobs over others and that gender segregation within the
workforce will endure as a matter of fact. Moreover, it must be recognized that political
solutions to the gender wage gap may be difficult to enact and the recommendations
advanced by this thesis may not be politically palatable. As a result, equal pay legislation
may continue to be primarily symbolic in its significance. In fact, it is arguable that
legislation is more often about practical policy, what will get passed versus what will get
passed over, rather than the noble goals policy seeks to achieve. This is well-illustrated
by the manner in which the legislative initiatives discussed in this thesis were
successively watered down and infused with exceptions in order to ensure successful
passage. But perhaps symbolic policy that lacks the teeth necessary to directly affect
change is better than nothing at all. Indeed, in spite of the many shortcomings of equal
pay legislation which has been passed to date, statistics conclude that the gender wage
gap has successively narrowed, albeit at a slow and uneven pace, since the passage of the
Equal Pay Act in 1963 up to the present (Dale and Levine 2005). Such evidence should
inspire optimism for future progress in closing the gender wage gap, suggesting that even
symbolic legislation has the potential to elicit cultural change, making people reconsider
previously held notions about the acceptability of gender-based wage inequality and
indirectly creating greater wage parity. In terms of addressing occupational segregation
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as a root cause of the gender wage gap, this may take place as a result of legislation
featuring measures similar to those advanced by this thesis. Such policies would
indirectly increase women’s representation in traditionally male-dominated jobs, rather
than forcing occupational integration of the sexes through mandate.
Ultimately, the gender wage gap may only be bridged as a result of slow and
evolutionary change, rather than being directly enacted through legislative prerogative.
Regardless of the implications of these intervening factors, perhaps the most important
contribution of this thesis is that it offers realistic recommendations for reaching greater
wage equality through legislative intervention, even if only along the margins. Genderbased wage inequality should be a matter of concern to all of us because, in one way or
another, we are all subject to its effects. Wage inequality affects all women and their
families whether they be single or married, old or young, college educated or high school
graduate, mothers, daughters and everywhere in between.
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